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1. INTRODUCTION
Considering the workers of a firm as some kind of capital can be dated back to 
Adam Smith. More recently, the theoretical school led by Shultz and Becker laid 
the foundation for a human capital investment theory. There are several questions 
at issue, from human capital measurement through labour market information 
asymmetries to human capital investment constraints. This paper contributes to 
the discussion by analysing the risk of individual human capital investment. The 
basic idea is that individuals are willing to spend time and/or money to invest 
in their own human capital because it will make them more valuable workers, 
among many other advantages, so they can earn more in the future. The cost of 
human capital is foregone earnings and monetary costs. The yield, for instance, 
can be a wage advantage because of enhanced productivity. It is a financial in-
vestment decision, particularly because human capital investment through higher 
education is a long-term investment and acquiring a degree can take 3, 5, or even 
more years. It is not easy to predict what the wage will be for a given qualifica-
tion, or whether there will be any demand for it on the labour market. Moreover, 
individual features can cause cycles in earnings. We can consider education a 
risky financial investment. 
An environment of agents making risky investments can create interesting sce-
narios. If they underestimate risks, and the investment is relatively cheap,1 this 
can lead to investment bubbles and eventually to a crisis. Some suspect that this 
is exactly what is going on at the student loan market. The argument laid out 
by writers such as Davies – Harrigan (2012), McCluskey (2013) and also in the 
Hungarian press is the following: American student loans, like the main lending 
mechanisms such as Stafford and Perkins loans, are federal loans; the govern-
ment is creating a bubble by allowing easy access to student loans, which has the 
effect of growing tuition fees. Higher tuition fees demand higher lending, which 
in turn creates higher tuition fees. Eventually, this will lead to a situation in which 
graduate borrowers will be unable to repay their debt and the government will be 
left with a huge amount of non-performing loans, a sure recipe for a debt crisis.
This problem has been identified outside of the US as well. The recent global 
economic crisis had a severe impact on the Hungarian economy that led to years 
of stagnation. It was one of the reasons behind the government’s justifications 
to intervene in the status quo of the Hungarian higher education system. Most 
students recently starting in fields such as economics or law must pay a full cost 
1  For instance, if one has to choose between a high chance of unemployment with low possible 
wage offers and a currently low-interest rate student loan and easy education, the second op-
tion might be very tempting, but will not have a high return.  
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contribution. To aid this change in the costs of education, a new student lending 
vehicle was introduced (Balogh et al. 2013), called Student Loan 2.2 
People everywhere spend a lot on risky investments in human capital. Is this 
something similar to an expansion of a bubble that will eventually lead to a crisis? 
If a higher education crisis happens, will it be similar to the recent US housing 
market correction? Can it be a trigger for a macroeconomic setback? This paper 
approaches these questions from two directions. First, it will consider whether the 
market is big enough to have a domino effect in the whole economy. Second, we 
will ask whether the investors can be considered financially reasonable, where 
they are least expected to be. By financial rationality we understand a behaviour 
which chooses higher risk only when it is rewarded by a higher return. The em-
pirical section will introduce results from a Hungarian sample. The education 
programs chosen by the sample can be fitted to an equation that is derived from 
the financial theory of the efficient frontier.
The paper will conclude that even where the higher education market size is 
huge, the numbers are not high enough to be considered as a potential risk factor. 
Moreover, rational financial behaviour patterns will be found where they are least 
expected. Combining the two conclusions means that human capital investment 
market growth is not a macroeconomic threat. The results will even suggest that 
the deterrent effect of the risk might not be the most interesting microeconomic 
problem either.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Becker (1964) gave examples, a theoretical background, and the tools to calculate 
the rate of return to education, and since then it has been a very popular topic in 
the literature (Psacharopoulos – Patrinos 2004). The basic idea was that invest-
ment in education is no different from financial investments from the point of 
view of decision-making. The value of the investment is the net present value 
of the cash-flows generated by it, and the rate of return is where the net present 
value is zero. Some of the more interesting findings are that the rate of return is 
exceptionally high (more than 10%), and that in some cases this does not dimin-
ish with a higher level of education, which basically means that the more we 
invest, the higher the rate of return we experience. Moreover, the social return is 
usually positive as well (T. Kiss 2010).
2  However, its popularity failed to live up to the expectations. Students were not really inter-
ested in the new scheme. 
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The risks of education investment have also been studied since the early 1970s. 
Some theoretical papers offer important insights (Levhari – Weiss 1974; Eaton – 
Rosen 1980; Hamilton 1987; Anderberg – Andersson 2003; da Costa – Maestri 
2007; Anderberg 2009; Jacobs et al. 2009) and there is some very useful empiri-
cal literature (Carniero et al. 2003; Cunera et al. 2004; Chen 2008). There is a 
debate over whether we should consider education a risky investment in human 
capital and/or as an insurance against labour market risks. Chen (2008) finds 
that the divergence from the expected return for education was unforeseeable 
for the cohort she examined. This means that it cannot be traced back to family 
background or individual features. Consequently, we cannot predict if someone 
will be better or worse off with a degree than the average degree holder. Hillman 
(2014) published a study dealing with the fact that students with low incomes and 
from minority backgrounds have a disproportionally high chance of defaulting 
on their student loan. This constitutes a risk. However, Anderberg – Anderson 
(2003) pointed out that degree holders have better labour market statistics, lower 
unemployment rates, higher earnings, and better health conditions. In this sense, 
a degree is an insurance, although it should be added that it is not an automated 
insurance like a car insurance. 
The possibility of taking out a loan for human capital investment is very im-
portant when we are discussing the issue of risk. It makes it possible to make 
investments today that might not be justified by a future income advantage. Hu-
man capital cannot serve as a mortgage, so in any case of default, the lender 
cannot be directly compensated. Thus, with student lending, a standard annuity 
loan is a bad risk because in low income periods it can trigger a default3 and 
the lender will be left with a huge outstanding sum. If this occurs en masse, the 
student loan company has to default as well. A risk management option can be 
to set the lending scheme to be income-contingent. With an income contingent 
loan, the borrowers pay a given share of their income. Theoretically, in this case, 
high losses can be deterred because there are no periods in life when the student 
loan repayment is a very high proportion of the income, or must be paid when the 
borrower is unemployed. The Hungarian student loan system works exactly like 
this, and the amount of payment is calculated from the level of income two years 
prior to the date the payments are due. However, it must be seen that serious and 
problematic over-investment will at some point cause financial turbulence under 
both financial schemes. 
This section has summarised what must be considered when searching for risk 
factors. We must take into account those costs of education that can be immedi-
ate and postponed. The postponed costs are the greater risk factors because they 
3 Bear in mind that the debtor also knows that nothing can be taken away from him or her.
RISKS OF STUDENT LOANS  633
Acta Oeconomica 65 (2015)
can be financed by future income, which is not guaranteed. If the student loan 
system defaults because of the high level of individual defaults, it can affect the 
higher education system itself. The current level of student numbers could not be 
financed4 by the students alone, and universities would be in need of a bailout, the 
burden of which might fall on the taxpayers.
A modern financial market practice is securitisation. Various articles (e.g. Nasser 
– Norman 2011) and academic papers (e.g. Gillen 2008) have pointed out that 
even student loans were part of the securitisation process. A summary of this lit-
erature can be found in Semjén (2013). The process itself is beneficial for every 
participant. Securitisation can allow more lending to students and less risk for the 
lender, as this process allocates the risk only to those who are willing to take the 
risk of a portfolio which includes student loans. This statement holds as long as 
student loans do not become garbage loans that default in most occasions without 
any mortgage asset to be taken. And this can indeed be the case: Macchiarola – 
Abraham (2010) showed that even degrees that traditionally offered safe returns 
– like degrees in law – have lost this feature in the new economy.5 If these student 
loans turn out to be garbage loans and most of them default, this can seriously 
decrease the trust in these derivatives. Such derivative products can multiply the 
size of a market because a basic asset can be the underlying asset of several de-
rivatives or be the beginning of a chain of derivative deals (Gillen 2008). There is 
no doubt that the student loan market exhibits most of the symptoms of a possible 
bubble (Macchiarola – Abraham 2010).
However, this argument is only valid if it is impossible to bail out student 
lenders or even the debtors. In the case of the housing market, it was impossible 
to bail out every failed loan, and it was also impossible to bail out every bank to 
keep the derivatives valuable.6 But if student lenders remain creditworthy in spite 
of student loan defaults, the derivatives will keep their value.
Based on the above, the following hypothesises will be examined:
 Hypothesis 1: There are many developed countries where private investment • 
in higher education is large enough compared to factors which cause regular 
macro cycles, such as financial market value or government spending. 
4  It is only a problem when the higher education financing system is highly reliant on private 
investment through tuition fees.
5  While mentioning this trend, we should not forget the expansion of education. More col-
leges and universities appeared, offering the same qualifications, but not necessarily the same 
quality (see, for example, Guri-Rosenblit et al. 2007 on the massification of education).
6 Serious moral hazard issues can be discussed here, as well.
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 Hypothesis 2: There are many countries where the student loan debt market • 
(postponed costs of investment) is comparable to housing debt, which we 
know can cause a crisis.
 Hypothesis 3: There is reason to think that the behaviour of average indi-• 
viduals when borrowing for education is not financially reasonable.
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The first two hypotheses will be examined through the analysis of Eurostat, 
OECD,7 and World Bank databases. The investigation of the third hypothesis 
is more complicated. Calculating Net Present Value for large investor groups is 
more feasible. A very detailed example is available in Avery – Turner (2012). 
They point out that in spite of the growing costs and indebtedness, choosing 
higher education is still a rational and rewarding investment for most; but it is not 
universal and there are people who lose out. 
It might not be surprising that US investors are more or less financially con-
sistent about their investment in education. The US education system is one of 
those that demand the most private investment. Their tuition fees are high com-
pared to the European education systems.
There are countries where the education system is in turbulent change, data 
availability is limited, and the initial financial investment is low. Hungary is a 
prime example of this. During the 2000–2010 period, the traditional 4-year col-
lege and 5-year university system was partially replaced by a 3-stage BSc-MSc-
PhD system. This was called the Bologna Process. The Hungarian higher educa-
tion system offers full-time training and part-time training as well. The education 
programs are available in state-funded form; however, if one studies for a second 
degree at a given level or cannot reach the minimum entry criteria,8 one can par-
ticipate in the same education programs making a cost contribution or paying a 
tuition fee.9 Even when a full cost contribution is necessary, it is mostly around 
500–1000 EUR per semester. Most recently, 77% of students taken on by the sys-
tem have been in state-funded programs. Those who apply for higher education 
can choose a wide variety of education programs, from 2-year programs to even 
6-year programs. Many of these programs are fairly new and were introduced by 
7 OECD’s “Education at a Glance” is the largest dataset that allows international comparison.
8  This is based on the applicants’ secondary school performance, final exam grades, and, in 
some cases, entry exams taken for the higher education institute.  
9  Even these education programs have minimum entry criteria, but these are lower than for 
state-financed programs. 
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the Bologna Process. Most of the applicants have access to state-financed pro-
grams. It is very difficult to make decisions in this environment because of the 
lack of information about the market value of these new types of degrees. Finan-
cial rationality is the least expected in such an environment. 
For our research, Christiansen et al. (2006) can be a very useful methodologi-
cal guide. They used a standard mean-variance analysis to better understand the 
risk-return trade-off. The original analysis was for risky security investments such 
as shares, bonds, or derivatives; this is the so-called Markowitz portfolio theory. 
They assumed that the available investment possibilities are different kinds of 
education degrees. Nowadays, the Markowitz portfolio theory is included in al-
most every financial textbook. 
  (1)
where σ2 is the variance of the portfolio return and E is the expected return of the 
portfolio.
Merton (1972) derived Equation (1) for the efficient frontier that is the set of 
optimal solutions of the investment problem.
Christiansen et al. (2006) suggest considering an education program as a port-
folio of human capital investments. Different education programs offer different 
enhancements of skills and knowledge. The assumption is that a human capital 
investor would prefer one education program over another if it offers the highest 
return on a given risk level or the lowest risk on a given return level.10 They find 
that some types of higher education degree fit this model, but there are some that 
do not fit. Some programs, for instance humanities, arts or nursing, do not offer a 
higher return for more variance, but there are still people who hold such degrees 
and choose these professions. These programs are not on the efficient frontier, but 
within it. Even the authors point out that some assumptions of the original model 
probably do not hold for the higher education market. The basic assumption of 
the theory is that students choose their profession based on risk-return reasoning. 
This is more likely to be true for financial securities, but for professions it is not 
that likely.
We will make a similar examination of a data sample of the Student Loan 
Centre of Hungary. This is not a public database, but no data was provided to 
me or any of my colleagues that has any reference to the borrowers’ identities. 
10  The financial portfolio theory asks what the optimal investment is if we have a given budget 
X. X is completely devoted to risky investment. If we apply this theory to education programs 
we must assume that every education program requires that we invest the same budget. This 
issue will be discussed later.
2 2
0 1 2 ,E Eσ β β β  
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Neither do my results have any relation to the business policy or profitability of 
the Student Loan Centre.
The database is for yearly annual gross real income from 2008 to 2012.11 As 
already mentioned, the Hungarian student loan scheme is income contingent. The 
Centre receives income data in order to calculate the necessary payment.12 The 
payment can be 6% or 8% of the income two years prior to the due date of the 
payment. The initial first two years’ payment is based on the minimum-wage. 
Individuals entered the sample if they had recorded income for any of the 
years in the indicated time period. The focus of the present study is education 
programs. Those programs were selected where at least 30 individuals’ income 
was recorded for the whole time period. Only state-financed and full-time educa-
tion programs were evaluated. Those who participated in more than one type of 
education program were excluded, as well as those who had no reported income.13 
The equal costs assumption does not apply for those who participated in several 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) programs. The final 
sample contained data for 20,146 individuals with 46,229 observations for 34 
education programs. The data for the education programs are available in Table 
2 of Appendix A. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
First, we look for countries where private investment in higher education can be 
a major macroeconomic factor. These countries should have a high investment in 
higher education and a large private investment as well. The first factor – high 
investment – is indicated in this paper by total spending on tertiary education 
per student. The second factor – private investment – is indicated by household 
spending, which is calculated from the ratio of household spending to total spend-
ing and the total spending value itself. In a country where higher education can 
be a risk factor, many people should have invested in higher education. In Graph 
1, the population with a tertiary level of education measures this. The 25–34-
year-old cohort is represented because it is the closest to the micro sample that 
will be discussed later,14 and because they might be the most interesting cohort in 
terms of future economic tendencies. Those countries are highlighted where total 
11  The price indices of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2014) were used for real income 
calculations. The previous year is 100. Year/Price Index: 2009/104.2; 2010/104.9; 2011/103.9; 
2012/105.7.  
12 Their data is from the National Tax and Customs Administration of Hungary.
13 See Appendix B for more on the decision to exclude observations with 0 income.
14 See Appendix.
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investment per student is high, as well as private investment, and a large portion 
of the population is involved in higher education. 
The US stands out as the largest circle with around 11,000 dollars spent per 
student from the household budget annually. Japan and the UK follow. Canada 
can be a major market if we look at total spending, but private spending is not that 
high. Tuition fees in Canada are lower. Canada and South Korea are also taken 
for further examination based on the extensive involvement of the population. 
In Japan, Canada, and Korea more than 50% of the age cohort obtain some kind 
of degree from tertiary education. If we consider the other countries,15 it can be 
noted that education expenditure can be high, but does not depend on household 
investment.16 For the average citizen in most of the OECD countries, choosing 
higher education has no greater financial risk then buying a new TV or a note-
book computer. Data for the countries are available in Appendix A, Table 1. 
15 Unnamed grey circles.
16 Chile is an interesting exception, but the total spending is much lower in Chile. 
Graph 1. Household spending on tertiary education 
Note: Horizontal axis: Population with a tertiary level of education, 25–34 years old, % in same age group; 
Vertical axis: Total spending on tertiary education, US dollars/student. Total spending multiplied by the ratio of 
household spending and total spending.
Source: OECD (2013).
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With Graph 1, we can identify mainly the United States, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and Korea as the countries where private financing 
can be a major economic factor. To decide whether or not it is, the total tertiary 
education spending (both private and public together) should be compared to the 
size of various major factors such as total government spending, total govern-
ment debt, total household debt, and the size of the stock market.
Graph 2 shows that the total spending – private and public combined – is so 
small compared to major economic factors such as government and household 
indebtedness, government social spending, or the size of the stock market compa-
nies that it is condensed almost to a dot in the middle of the graph. Total spending 
on higher education is between 1 and 2.5% of the annual GDP, whereas social 
spending is around 20%, the stock market size is around 100% with large differ-
ences, and the debt data are even larger.17 If we made an intertemporal compari-
son, we would find that a regular variance, for example in government debt, can 
cover the whole of higher education spending. This shows that in extreme cases, 
the government has the ability to intervene in a smaller market such as higher 
education or the student loan debt market with a regular government bond issue.
The United States stands out as the country with the largest higher educa-
tion market. However, if we compare the compiled student loan with the total 
17  Although we compare various stock and flow variables, we emphasise this again to show the 
size differences, which is the real purpose behind the comparison.
Graph 2. Total government spending, total government debt, total household debt, 
and the size of the stock market
Source: Worldbank (2013), Eurostat (2013).
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household debt, we see that the share of student loans in the total level of debt 
has risen from 1% to merely 9% during the last decade, i.e. it is still small com-
pared to mortgage loans. When the total student loan debt hit the 1 trillion dollar 
mark in the United States, there was intense debate in the press over whether 
student loans will be the next financial bubble, as was mentioned earlier. But, as 
we showed, even in the United States, where the tuition fees are the highest and 
student lending has the longest tradition, only 9% of household debt is made up 
of student loans (NyFed 2013). 
The student loans are mostly federal loans. In the 2012–2013 academic year, 
110 billion dollars were lent, but only 8% of this was non-federal. Non-federal 
loans are not necessarily private loans; they include loans to students from US 
states and from institutions, in addition to private loans issued by banks, credit 
unions, and Sallie Mae (CollegeBoard 2013). The main income of the state is 
not the repayment and the interest on these loans. Some of the outstanding loan 
is in the balance sheet of private companies such as commercial and investment 
banks, but the current tendency would have to continue for at least 2 decades (i.e. 
student loans should reach 30%) to become a major macroeconomic risk factor. 
So we can conclude that the student loan market and higher education spending 
are small in comparison with the markets that economic analysts pay most atten-
tion to when trying to assess the possibility of an economic downturn. 
Based on these relations, we can reject Hypotheses 1 and 2. The next task is to 
evaluate Hypothesis 3 by testing Equation (1).
The first step is to fit Equation (2) to the data, therefore a return measure must 
be defined. Christiansen et al. (2006) will be followed. Two types of return will 
be calculated: raw logarithmic income and Mincer residuals. Only the Mincer 
residuals are discussed in our paper. Mincer (1958) introduced a very simple ap-
proach for the rate of return to education. The so-called Mincer equation can be 
expressed in the form of Equation (2):
  (2)
where si is years of schooling for individual i, and xi is the experience of indi-
vidual i.
It can be shown that if certain conditions are met, the coefficient of school-
ing (β1) in the Mincer equation (Equation 2) is the rate of return to education 
(Heckman et al. 2005). The average εi, so the average residual will be the Mincer 
equation for an education group. The individual Mincer residual is defined in 
equation (3): 
   (3)
where εijt is the Mincer residual for individual i with education j, at time t.
2
0 1 1 2 3 ,i i ilnW s x xβ β β β ε    
2
0 1 2 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ),ijt ijt i i ilnw s x xε β β β β    
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The Mincer residual can be understood as a redefinition of foregone earnings 
because it compares the earnings to the expected earnings with the same years 
of schooling. It asks whether an individual with a given education can earn more 
than what is expected purely on his/her years of education and experience. 
Risk will be measured by the average standard deviation for an education 
group for both return measures. This is formulated by equation (4):
  (4)
where σj is the standard deviation of return for education group j, nj is the number 
of individuals in education group j, ni is the number of observations for the indi-
vidual i, and εij is the average Mincer residual for individual i.
Graph 3 is the risk-return map, where the return is the Mincer residual and 
the risk is the time series standard deviation of it.18 Graph 3 offers the interest-
ing suggestion that those who finished higher education after a vocational train-
18 The results for the Mincer model are presented in Appendix A, Table 3.
2
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Graph 3. Scatter-plot of average Mincer residuals and their standard deviations in some education 
programs, Hungarian student loan system 
Source: Student Loan Centre.
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ing course tend to underperform compared to the Mincer model prediction. BSc 
programs are spread widely, and MSc and traditional 4-year college programs 
are concentrated more narrowly around the 0 line. This seems to suggest that the 
Mincer predictions might be better for longer education programs. This might be 
a convincing argument if we assume that education needs an extended period to 
make an impact on future productivity.19
Table 1 summarises the results used to fit equation (1) to the data of Graph 3. 
The P-values suggest that the coefficient of the Mincer residual are not significant 
at the usual significance levels, but the squared residual is significant at 1% and 
the R2 is 52.6%, so the model should not be rejected. There can be some kind of 
human capital or financial barrier that does not allow individuals to choose longer 
education programs with favourable risk-return combinations. For instance, MSc 
Health is one of the best combinations in a risk-return sense. The theory would 
claim that people must prefer MSc Health over BSc Health or vocational training 
(VT)20 in Health Sciences. However, the fact is that these programs exist, so this 
might suggest, for example, that somebody who studies to be a nurse does not 
have the human capital requirements to be a surgeon.21 Another possibility is that 
foregone earnings might cause different levels of stress for different individu-
als. For example, someone might not be able to choose to stay out of the labour 
market for the extended time that a BSc+MSc combination demands, even if it is 
financially feasible by taking out a student loan.22
The connection between risk and return suggested by Graph 3 and Table 1 
makes an interesting addition to the arguments set out by Anderberg – Andersson 
(2003), da Costa – Maestri (2007), Anderberg (2009), and Jacobs et al. (2009). 
They established that education has an insurance effect up to a point. This is the 
19  Or it might suggest some kind of counter-signalling behaviour, but this would lead us away 
from the human capital theory. For more on counter-signalling, see Feltovich et al. (2001).
20  Vocational training is usually 2 or 3 semesters long in a higher education institute or in a spe-
cialised institute.
21  If the sample included secondary education grades or IQ test results, then this theory would be 
testable.
22  This theory would be testable if parents’ income and wealth data were available. 
Table 1. Estimation of equation (1)
Estimate Std. Error t value P value
Intercept 0.09218 0.01427 6.460 3.34e-07
(Mincer residual)2 0.52903 0.16469 3.212 0.00307
Mincer residual –0.06042 0.06063 –0.997 0.32668
R2 0.5258
N 34
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coefficients of the mean-variance parabola estimated in Table 1. However, we 
should not immediately call for subsidisation because the lack of finance is not 
necessarily the reason behind non-optimal investment. 
We found some places where a drastic change in private spending on higher 
education or repayments of student loans can threaten the macroeconomic bal-
ance. It was shown that even in the United States, student loan debt is not nearly 
as significant as mortgage loans. Student loans are on the federal state balance 
sheet, not on that of private companies. A sudden stop in the flow of private in-
vestment does not threaten the financing of higher education because the federal 
state plays a major role in this as well. 
Some can argue that there are places where the government might not be pow-
erful enough even to react to a smaller crisis in student lending and higher educa-
tion financing. We have provided evidence that even in Hungary, where many 
students participate in state-funded programs, those who borrowed money for 
education in a complex and dynamically changing environment were still ra-
tional. The typical patterns of a financially rational choice of education programs 
can be found.
The combination of a relatively small market and financially rational behav-
iour suggests that the risk of macroeconomic crisis caused by a student loan mar-
ket bubble is quite small.
5. CONCLUSION
We tested three hypotheses and stated that 1) there are some developed countries 
where private investment in higher education is large enough compared to factors 
which cause regular macro cycles such as financial market value or government 
spending; 2) there are countries where the student loan debt market (the post-
poned costs of investment) is comparable to housing debt, which we know can 
cause a crisis; and 3) there is a reason to think that the behaviour of the average 
individual who borrows for education is not financially reasonable. 
The education investment data of the OECD was examined and there were 
six countries which stood out where private investment in education plays a ma-
jor role, and higher education expenditure is high in global comparison. These 
are the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Japan, and South 
Korea . Nevertheless, none of the above-mentioned countries spends so much on 
higher education that it can be compared to the size of the financial market, or 
international debt markets. When different categories of the indebtedness of US 
households were compared, it was found that student loan debt only accounts for 
9% of the total indebtedness, and this is small compared to mortgage loans. This 
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debt is owed to the central budget of the United States, as only 8% of the loans 
are non-federal.
When financial rationality was examined, a Hungarian borrower sample was 
chosen because Hungary has less experience in student loan financing and there 
were many new types of programs, with little labour feedback at the time of deci-
sion making. The sample included student loan borrowers, who participated in 
state-funded, full-time education programs. In our analysis, the methodology of 
Christiansen et al. (2006) was used. The risk-return trade-off predicted by the fi-
nancial theory of portfolio investments could be traced back. Based on this result, 
we asserted that financial rationality is true for human capital investors even in a 
dynamically changing environment. 
There were education programs that fitted at the non-optimal part of the ef-
ficient frontier. Various possible explanations were mentioned for these very in-
teresting cases, and they can be interesting topics for further research. If there are 
short-term education programs on the non-optimal part of the efficient frontier, 
more studies could act as insurance, but after the minimal variance point, educa-
tion is a risky investment. Interestingly, in the argument set out in the literature 
review it might be possible that both sides are right.  
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APPENDIX A
Table 1. International education financing data for Graph 3 (2010–2011)
 
Population w
ith tertiary 
education, 25–34 years 
old, %
 in sam
e age 
group
Education spending, 
tertiary education, U
S 
dollars/student
H
ousehold spending 
on tertiary education, 
U
S dollars/student, 
calculated
United States 43 25,576 11,586
United Kingdom 47 15,862 9,211
Japan 59 16,015 8,116
Australia 45 15,142 5,925
South Korea 64 9,972 4,901
Chile 41 7,100 4,836
Canada 57 22,475 4,542
New Zealand 46 10,418 3,343
Israel 45 10,730 2,926
Netherlands 40 17,161 2,560
Mexico 23 7,872 2,436
Portugal 27 10,578 2,358
Italy 21 9,580 2,281
Spain 39 13,373 2,244
Ireland 47 16,008 2,207
Poland 39 8,866 2,019
Russian Federation 57 7,039 1,930
Germany 28 15,711 1,854*
Sweden 43 19,562 1,839
France 43 15,067 1,460
Estonia 39 6,501 1,183
Slovenia 34 9,693 1,043
Denmark 39 18,977 949**
Belgium 42 15,178 832
Slovak Republic 26 6,904 805
Czech Republic 25 7,635 669
Finland 39 16,714 669*
Iceland 39 8,728 641
Norway 47 18,512 562
Austria 21 15,007 435
* Based on the 2000 total private investment in higher education.
** Based on the 2010 total private investment in higher education.
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Table 2. Data calculated for some education programs in the Hungarian student loan 
borrower sample (2008–2012)
 
EDUCATIONAL_GROUP
R
aw
 
logarithm
ic 
incom
e
Standard 
deviation of 
R
LI
M
incer 
residuals
Standard 
deviation of 
M
R
N
um
ber 
of observations
N
um
ber
of students  
Length of total 
education
(years)
1 VT Humanities and Art 14.33 0.28 0.20 0.28 74 36 14
2 VT Social 13.83 0.38 –0.28 0.37 1,963 902 14
3 VT Natural 13.79 0.39 –0.34 0.39 277 127 14
4 VT Engineering 14.18 0.35 –0.04 0.37 146 61 14
5 VT Health 13.25 0.84 –0.63 0.76 90 42 14
6 VT Services 13.68 0.41 –0.41 0.42 867 405 14
7 BSc Education 14.09 0.30 –0.26 0.33 533 208 15
8 BSc Humanities and Art 13.41 0.56 –0.57 0.53 124 69 15
9 BSc Social 14.38 0.36 0.08 0.35 1,817 746 15
10 BSc Natural 14.41 0.30 0.13 0.30 1,653 712 15
11 BSc Engineering 14.47 0.30 0.17 0.31 3,421 1,455 15
12 BSc Agricultural 14.13 0.35 –0.22 0.34 432 177 15
13 BSc Health 13.94 0.47 –0.28 0.47 93 41 15
14 BSc Services 14.63 0.27 0.34 0.27 757 338 15
15 BSc Social 14.61 0.31 0.30 0.31 4,750 2,061 15.5
16 BSc Natural 14.56 0.32 0.22 0.33 577 233 15.5
17 BSc Engineering 13.96 0.48 –0.17 0.43 859 416 15.5
18 BSc Services 14.03 0.35 –0.13 0.34 196 100 15.5
19 TC Education 14.01 0.37 –0.41 0.38 3,028 1,309 16
20 TC Humanities and Art 14.06 0.41 –0.35 0.41 830 360 16
21 TC Social 14.42 0.31 –0.02 0.32 1,323 577 16
22 TC Natural 14.36 0.29 –0.12 0.32 175 70 16
23 TC Engineering 14.56 0.21 0.14 0.26 181 90 16
24 TC Health 14.11 0.37 –0.33 0.36 1,820 788 16
25 TC Services 14.38 0.36 –0.05 0.36 1,518 659 16
26 MSc Education 14.02 0.34 –0.46 0.32 503 226 17
27 MSc Humanities and Art 14.08 0.41 –0.46 0.41 2,376 1,071 17
28 MSc Social 14.67 0.34 0.11 0.32 7,218 3,090 17
29 MSc Natural 14.55 0.37 0.06 0.37 2,474 1,102 17
30 MSc Engineering 14.68 0.36 0.17 0.35 3,123 1,346 17
31 MSc Agricultural 14.12 0.39 –0.45 0.38 764 330 17
32 MSc Health 14.54 0.35 0.03 0.33 579 262 17
33 MSc Services 14.44 0.38 –0.13 0.37 607 254 17
34 MSc Health 14.57 0.39 –0.12 0.39 1,081 483 18
Note: In an education program, all people were grouped together who participated in an education program 
based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) code. (See ISCED codes in Graph B 
of Appendix B.) For example, all who had participated in a program with ISCED code starting 1 and studied 
for 15 years in total (finishing education around the age of 22) finished BSc Education, whereas those who had 
participated in a program with ISCED code 7 and studied for 17 years total, were grouped in MSc Health. VT: 
Vocational training, BSc: Bachelor of Sciences, TC: Traditional College, MSc: Master of Sciences.
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Table 3. Mincer equation
Estimate Std. Error t value P value
Intercept 11.656059 0.067222 173.40 <2e–16 ***
Years of schooling 0.136602 0.004146 32.94 <2e–16 ***
Experience 0.401274 0.007101 56.51 <2e–16 ***
(Experience)2 –0.046715 0.001115 –41.91 <2e–16 ***
R2 0.1009
N 46229
Note: The coefficients are significant, but the explanatory power of the model is very weak. Experience is cal-
culated from the beginning of the loan repayment. The average experience is 2.74 years, so subjects are from 
the 25–34 age cohort, which was used in the international comparison. This does not necessarily correspond to 
work experience, but this is the best approximation that can be made on the available dataset. It is worth point-
ing out that the rate of return is 13.6%, which is a very plausible result.
APPENDIX B
Connection between loan and repayment
The Student Loan Centre receives its income information for the repayment cal-
culations from the National Tax and Customs Administration of Hungary. How-
ever, if an individual has not prepared a tax return, this means he/she has 0 taxable 
income in Hungary. Many of the clients who pay back their loan belong to this 
category. In fact, 14.37% was the average 0 income ratio23 among the 34 educa-
tion groups. There can be several reasons for this, including the following:
–  The borrower is inactive and does not receive any financial assistance, but 
uses his savings for repayment.
–  The borrower is inactive and does not receive any financial assistance, but 
the family or relatives repay.
–  The borrower works abroad and does a tax return there.
–  The borrower has income, but does not report it. 
The reasons for inactivity can be manifold; for instance, an individual gradu-
ates, but starts the repayment, or waits for better job opportunities, and in some 
cases they might not work because they are unable to. Interestingly, as Table B 
suggests, there is a strong negative linear connection between the raw log income 
of the education group and the ratio of 0 income. This suggests that 0 income 
is more of a decision than a risk. The option value of education is a rich field 
in educational economics as well (Eide – Waehrer 1998). 0 income can be an 
23 The number of 0 income observations was compared to the total number of observations.
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unexercised option if it is not the product of foreign earnings. Working abroad is 
very popular among young graduates.24 The correlation between years of educa-
tion and the 0 income ratio is –0.18, which means they might be independent, but 
unemployment and the length of education usually shows a strong relationship. 
As Graph B suggests, there is no connection between the type of education and 
the 0 income ratio, except maybe that for ISCED code 2, i.e. humanities and arts, 
where it is higher than for ISCED code 3, i.e. social sciences and arts. 
Based on the fact that 0 income does not necessarily mean unemployment or 
inactivity because of inability to work, it appears preferable to clear the sample 
from the 0 income data because it might cause less distortion to leave out some 
unintentionally unemployed workers than to hugely overestimate the risk and 
underestimate the return by retaining a lot of the 0 incomes of those who might 
have an income or still be studying. All the further calculations are for non-zero 
income individuals. 
24  See, for example, the following article: http://eduline.hu/felnottkepzes/2014/2/7/A_BGFes_
friss_diplomasok_harmada_tervez_kul_E18VDA
Graph B: Boxplot of the 0 income ratio by ISCED codes, student loan data sample, 
Hungary, 2008–2015 
Note: ISCED codes: 1 – Education; 2 – Humanities and Arts; 3 – Social; 4 – Natural; 5 – Engineering; 
6 – Agriculture; 7 – Health; 8 – Services.
Table B. Connection between raw logarithmic income and the ratio of 0 income observations
Estimate Std. Error t value P value
Intercept 1.80375 0.24337 7.412 1.97e–08
Ratio of 0 income 
observations 
–0.11680 0.01712 –6.823 1.02e-07
R2 0.5258
N 34
